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Abstract: Richard Rorty’s liberal utopia offers an interesting model for 
those who wish to explore the emancipatory potential of a post-
foundational account of politics, specifically liberalism. What Rorty 
proposes is a form of liberalism that is divorced from its Kantian 
metaphysical foundations. This paper will focus on the gulf that appears 
between Rorty’s liberal utopia in theory, the political form that it must 
ultimately manifest itself in, and the consequences this has for debates on 
pluralism, diversity, and identity, within liberal political thought.  
The strength of Rorty’s liberal utopia, in his analysis, lies in the fact that 
with the rejection of philosophy and metaphysics, we can simply get on 
with the job of reducing cruelty through experimental tinkering with the 
liberal political system. Instead of trying to develop intellectually 
sophisticated justifications for why we act, we should just act. Political 
action, for Rorty, does not require a philosophical or metaphysical 
justification. However, upon closer critical examination, we can see that 
whatever potential Rorty’s liberal utopia may have in theory, this is 
negated by the fact that at the level of political praxis, his re-description of 
liberalism leaves us with a conception of liberalism that is essentially 
unchanged. Whilst Rorty has re-situated liberalism from the philosophical 
to the political, his solution fails to address any internal problems. 
Keywords: Richard Rorty; pluralism; liberalism; Enlightenment 
liberalism; the political; conflict; feminism; post-foundationalism; 
public/private distinction 
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1. Introduction  
The relationship between Richard Rorty and the realm of politics, especially his 
account of liberalism, is a contested one. His philosophical writings have been 
criticised for embracing post-modern relativism at the expense of universal values, 
whilst his political writings have been dismissed as being nothing more than an 
apology and uncritical defence of North American liberal democracy. However, it is 
my contention that Rorty’s account of politics, especially liberalism, has been too 
readily dismissed, or at the very least, dismissed for the wrong reasons. 
Accordingly, this paper will focus on aspects of Rorty’s political thought, 
predominantly his re-interpretation and defence of liberalism. More specifically, 
however, this paper will examine Rorty’s account of post-foundational liberalism, 
which is a form of political association that is explicitly severed from any 
metaphysical foundation, universal normative values, or a priori truth claims. To 
achieve this aim, I will examine Rorty’s post-foundational liberalism through the lens 
of pluralism, diversity, and identity. To be exact, I will examine the extent to which 
Rorty’s post-foundational liberalism is able to accommodate and support the demands 
of diversity and pluralism within the modern liberal democratic polity.  
Whilst at first glance Rorty may have very little to offer with regards to issues of 
diversity and pluralism, I suggest that this is not the case. What I take from Rorty is 
the possibility of an approach to political association and justification that is explicitly 
divorced from metaphysics, irrespective of the arguments and values contained within 
such a metaphysical viewpoint. What Rorty offers us is a purely political form of 
political association. Rorty’s rejection of metaphysics and philosophy is premised on 
his rejection of a Platonist or Kantian understanding of the world. For Rorty, this 
means “giving up the Kantian idea that there is something called ‘the nature of human 
knowledge’ or ‘the scope and limits of human knowledge’ or ‘the human epistemic 
situation’ for philosophers to study and describe” (Rorty 1999b, 34). For pragmatists, 
both classical and modern, there is a rejection of the belief that there is a way things 
‘really are’. Instead of this appearance/reality dichotomy, pragmatists such as Rorty 
want to use descriptions of the world and ourselves which are more useful than 
previous descriptions (Rorty 1999b, 27). 
Metaphysics and philosophy, therefore, cannot refer to external a priori truths as 
these truths cannot exist outside the realm of human languages and values. Therefore, 
if one is to defend certain metaphysical or philosophical ideas, it must be done with 
recourse to the various values that communities hold, or wish to hold. By extension, it 
is erroneous for forms of political association, such as liberal democracy, to defend 
their legitimacy by recourse to metaphysics. Liberal democracy cannot be justified in 
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terms of Kantian metaphysics, but can, however, be defended in terms of the values 
that its members wish to propagate. 
This pragmatist approach to metaphysics and philosophy, indeed to truth itself, 
ought not be misunderstood as a rejection of the fact that there exists a real 
environment outside of the realm of human languages, that this environment has a 
direct influence on us, and that we do interact with this environment. Indeed, as Rorty 
notes, “human belief cannot swing free of the nonhuman environment” (Rorty 1999b, 
32). We can use language to describe objects and forces that are part of this real 
environment. However, the use of this language is not the same as describing the 
intrinsic nature of the world. Rorty, following Donald Davidson, argues that a truth 
theory for natural language (that is to say language which refers to and describes the 
objects and forces in the natural environment, such as biology and physics) is 
essentially nothing more than an “empirical explanation of the causal relations which 
hold between features of the environment” (Rorty, 1999b, 33). 
Therefore, for Rorty, language does not describe objects and concepts external to 
these causal relationships, as these things do not exist. Metaphysics and philosophy 
cannot refer to external a priori truths, but instead are stories that we tell each other, 
and thus reflect values that various communities come to hold. Liberal democracy, 
therefore, cannot be justified by recourse to any Kantian metaphysical argument. 
Rather, for Rorty, we continue to use and defend liberal democracy because it is the 
best means we have for both reducing cruelty and promoting human flourishing. 
My concern with Rorty, however, is not linked to the validity of his philosophical 
argument regarding whether or not truth exists. Rather, I focus on weaknesses within 
the political application of these views.  More specifically, I argue that whilst Rorty’s 
idea of a form of political association that is purely functional and not linked to any 
metaphysical or philosophical foundation has potential, in the form that it is presented 
to us, there is no room for the examination of important normative questions and 
considerations. Drawing on the critical analyses of Justin Cruickshank and Honi F. 
Haber, I argue that Rorty’s post-foundational liberal utopia is actually anti-political. 
This has the detrimental effect of only allowing for what Rorty refers to as 
“experimental tinkering” (Rorty 1978, 565) within the already existing liberal 
democratic framework. I posit that Rorty’s approach is not wrong per se, but rather, 
that it does not go far enough – it does not embrace the political where this is 
understood in terms of a clash of values. 
2. Enlightenment Liberalism 
Before Rorty’s post-foundational approach to politics is critically examined, we 
first need to address the question as to why such a (non-traditional) approach to 
politics and political association may be beneficial, especially within the modern 
liberal democratic polity. What benefits are to be gained from a functional account of 
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politics which traditional accounts are unable to generate? As I have argued 
elsewhere, I suggest that the advantage of a functional account of politics - that is to 
say an account of politics that is explicitly severed from any normative or 
metaphysical foundation - is that it may be more capable of generating the assent of a 
diverse body of citizens than one that has distinct and overt normative or 
metaphysical overtones (Jones 2012). 
The modern liberal democratic polity is not a homogenous entity; it is an 
increasingly diverse state that is characterised by forms of pluralism and 
multiculturalism. This diversity, in and of itself, is not problematical. Indeed, for 
many citizens of the modern liberal democratic polity, this diversity contributes to the 
richness of their lives and is a source of pride. However, within the post-9/11 political 
landscape, issues of difference and integration have re-emerged to dominate the 
political and social discourse. Questions regarding the extent to which the 
contemporary liberal democratic polity ought to accommodate and support the 
demands of multiculturalism, pluralism, and diversity, are being asked, at times with 
increased hostility. These questions become increasingly problematic when they focus 
on the integration (or perceived lack thereof) of groups which are often considered to 
be “non-liberals” into the larger liberal democratic polity. Andrea Baumeister refers 
to this as the “politics of difference” (Baumeister 2000), and notes that “recently 
many liberal writers have become increasingly aware of the need to address the 
challenges and potential difficulties posed by the existence in most western-liberal 
democracies of diverse cultural groups, many of which do not share the values and 
beliefs typically associated with liberalism” (Baumeister 1998, 919). More recently, 
Baumeister has stated that: 
 
One of the most striking features of recent political discourse has been the rise of 
cultural pluralism and ‘the politics of difference’. For liberalism this emphasis on 
difference and particularity has frequently been rather problematic. Indeed, since 
the onset of Romanticism, critics have rejected the liberal preoccupation with 
universalism as a failure to acknowledge the significance of those characteristics 
that distinguish one particular group from another (Baumeister 2000, vii). 
 
Two recent events demonstrate very clearly how the demands of multiculturalism 
can clash with the values held by modern liberal democratic polities. These are the 
Danish cartoon controversy of 2005, and, more recently, moves by the French state in 
2010 to ban any covering that obscures an individual’s face. However, whilst these 
debates are often crudely reduced to a rather binary position of “the West versus 
Islam”, or “us versus them” (Huntington 1997), it would be wrong to think that it is 
only Islam that clashes with certain aspects of liberalism. Indeed, running parallel 
with the emergence of liberal political thought from the Enlightenment onwards has 
been a growing body of diverse critical voices, ranging from the Romantics to the 
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communitarians, certain modes of feminist thought, to advocates of pluralism and 
multiculturalism. What unites this diverse body of critical voices is not a wholesale 
rejection of liberalism (although there certainly have been those who have made this 
call), but rather a critical examination of certain metaphysical and normative 
underpinnings contained within liberalism.  
It is at this point that an important clarification needs to be made. It is wrong to 
suggest that liberalism is a singular and coherent body of thought. The target of these 
diverse critical voices is a form of liberalism that I, following Gerald Gaus, refer to as 
“Enlightenment liberalism” (Gaus 2003). What makes Enlightenment liberalism 
distinct from other forms of liberalism, such as Reformation liberalism, is its claim of 
the overriding metaphysical value of autonomy, and the belief in its universal 
authority. This distinction also mirrors that made by John Gray, who writes of the 
“two faces of liberalism”, the first of which he traces to Kant with its focus on the 
autonomous individual and perfectionism, and the second to Locke with its focus on 
toleration and modus vivendi (Gray 2002). Thus, Enlightenment liberalism is a form 
of universal perfectionist liberalism. 
Whilst Enlightenment liberalism is a specific term that I have borrowed from 
Gaus, I can find support for this conception of liberalism from other political 
philosophers, who, despite the fact that they use different labels, describe a very 
similar conception of liberalism. John Tomasi refers to an “ethical liberalism”, which 
is characterized by the cultivation of autonomy or individuality within the citizen 
(Tomasi 2001, 12-13). David Owen writes of “philosophical liberalism”, which is 
characterized by three distinct features: “a particular conception of the person, a form 
of asocial individualism and a commitment to universalism” (Owen 1995, 7). This 
conception of the person has a strong metaphysical grounding, and treats each 
individual as an “antecedently individuated subject” (Owen 1995, 7). That is to say 
that the individual exists prior to the state or society, as well as to its particular and 
contingent conception of the good. The individual is also characterized by the 
capacity for autonomous rational reflection and action. Furthermore, this capacity 
exists independently of any social role they may have. This particular conception of 
the individual receives political expression in the thesis of asocial individualism. 
Here, society is understood as a contract between the antecedently individuated 
subjects, and is given tangible expression as the state (Owen 1995, 7). Finally, this 
specific conception of liberalism is neither contingent nor particular. Rather, it is a 
conception of how political association ought to be. As Owen writes: 
 
The universalism of this conception of the relations between the individual and 
society and its expression in the liberal state flows from the metaphysical 
conception of the person, since what makes this conception ‘metaphysical’ is the 
claim that it applies universally to all human beings or, rather, defines what it is 
essentially to be a human being (Owen 1995, 7). 
 6 
 
Whilst Gaus, Owen, and Tomasi, use different terms, it is my position that they are 
describing the same conception of liberalism. 
In what capacity, then, does Rorty’s form of post-foundational liberalism help us to 
eliminate some of the restrictive and exclusionary effects of Enlightenment 
liberalism? The strength of Rorty’s liberal utopia, in his analysis, lies in the fact that 
he has disentangled politics from metaphysics, specifically liberal politics from 
Kantian metaphysics. Liberal politics and political institutions are not in need of more 
metaphysical, philosophical, or theoretical work regarding their justificatory basis or 
content. Instead, liberal politics should concentrate on how to improve the political 
institutions and values that already exist within liberal democratic societies. It is not 
that philosophical questions are not interesting or unimportant, but rather that they are 
a distraction (Bernstein 2003, 131). As Rorty argues: 
 
For the liberal ironist, there is no answer to the question “Why not be cruel?” – no 
noncircular theoretical backup for the belief that cruelty is horrible. Nor is there an 
answer to the question “How do you decide when to struggle against injustice and 
when to devote yourself to private projects of self-creation?” This question strikes 
liberal ironists as just as hopeless as the questions “Is it right to deliver n innocents 
over to be tortured to save the lives of m × n other innocents? If so, what are the 
correct values of n and m?” or the question “When may one favor members of 
one’s family, or one’s community, over other, randomly chosen, human beings?” 
Anyone who thinks that there are well-grounded theoretical answers to this sort of 
question – algorithms for resolving dilemmas of this sort – is still, in his heart, a 
theologian or a metaphysician. He believes in an order beyond existence and 
establishes a hierarchy of responsibilities (Rorty 1989, xv). 
 
Human cruelty is reduced, and flourishing is promoted, not through the 
metaphysical or theoretical work of liberal political theorists and legal scholars, but 
rather through the cultivation of solidarity. Solidarity is not achieved and sustained 
through metaphysics or rational analysis, but is instead created. As Rorty notes, “it is 
created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular pain and humiliation of other, 
unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to 
marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking, “They do not feel it as we 
would,” or “there must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer?”” (Rorty 
1989, xvi). For Rorty, perhaps the most effective way of achieving and sustaining this 
sense of solidarity is not through theory, but rather through “genres such as 
ethnography, the journalist’s report, the comic book, the docudrama, and, especially, 
the novel” (Rorty 1989, xvi). Here, in particular, we see Rorty promote Dickens, 
James, and Nabokov. Perhaps a more contemporary example that helps to illustrate 
this point is Michael Moore’s 2007 documentary film Sicko. Despite the numerous 
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medical, legal, economic, and academic papers written on the benefits to be gained 
through the implementation of a non-profit universal health care system in America, 
this documentary was perhaps more effective in generating support through the 
cultivation of human solidarity via stories that we could relate to.  
Returning to the focus of this paper, for Rorty, political action does not require 
metaphysical or philosophical justification; it does not require more theorizing. 
Instead of trying to develop intellectually sophisticated justifications for why or how 
we ought to act, we should just act. I posit that shifting the justificatory discourse of 
liberalism away from Kantian metaphysics (with its corresponding emphasis on 
autonomy) towards a functional account of liberalism will have the effect of removing 
normative considerations that are considered to be unnecessarily exclusive and 
restrictive. It is within this context that a critical examination of Rorty’s post-
foundational approach to politics and political association is warranted. 
3. The Anti-Political Nature of Rorty’s Liberal Utopia 
Given the unique, and for some, no doubt unsettling nature of Rorty’s liberal 
critique and subsequent post-foundational redescription, it is perhaps not surprising 
that his views – both philosophical and political – have been challenged. However, 
without dismissing the validity of these critiques, I do not wish my critical voice to be 
interpreted as nothing more than a broad survey of these criticisms. Rather, I wish to 
address the extent to which Rorty’s philosophical and political views are adequately 
coherent and deep enough to deal with the issues associated with pluralism, diversity, 
and identity. 
As I will demonstrate in the following sections, it is my contention that Rorty’s 
philosophical and political project does not offer anything particularly useful for those 
who wish to escape from a narrow conception of Kantian metaphysics, and yet desire 
a strong conception of the political. Despite Rorty’s (admittedly very eloquent) 
redescription of liberalism and its foundations, what he leaves us with is a conception 
of liberalism that is essentially unchanged. Whilst Rorty has resituated liberalism 
from the philosophical to the political, from the metaphysical to the functional, many 
of the problems associated with Enlightenment liberalism, such as the continued focus 
on autonomy, remain. In order to defend this argument, I will draw on the exposition 
and analyses of both Justin Cruickshank (2000, 1-23) and Honi Haber (1994, 43-72; 
1993a, 61-74).1 Whilst the foci of their work differ, they come to similar conclusions 
regarding the suitability of Rorty’s liberal utopia for addressing issues of pluralism 
and the political. 
3.1. Liberalism by Fiat 
                                                
1 For a critical response to Haber’s argument, see Martin (1993, 75-81). Haber’s reply to Martin can be 
found in (1993b, 83-84). 
 8 
The aim of Cruickshank’s article is to examine three separate arguments that he 
believes Rorty proposes in order to solidify and justify the link between pragmatism 
and liberalism. These are: (1) the “pragmatist-ethnocentric argument” for liberalism; 
(2) the “social contract argument”; and (3) the “positivistic-conservatism argument”. 
Cruickshank finds that ultimately none of these three arguments can provide a 
sufficiently robust argument linking pragmatism to liberalism. The “pragmatist-
ethnocentric argument” for this link fails because it ultimately collapses back towards 
relativism (Cruickshank, 4-10); and the social contact argument is unsuccessful 
because it results in an extreme form of individualism, and a liberal state that cannot 
provide any justification for intervention to protect its population of poets 
(Cruickshank, 10-17). It is, however, Cruickshank’s third argument that is directly 
relevant to this paper. The crux of this argument is that the positivistic-conservative 
approach can only justify liberalism by fiat, and in doing so remove any space for the 
examination of normative issues, either metaphysical or political, that question and 
challenge the status quo. That is to say, Rorty’s liberal utopia is devoid of any 
substantive political content, where politics is conceived as being a clash of beliefs 
and opinions, as opposed to mere administration, or, to use Rorty’s phrase, 
“experimental tinkering” (Rorty 1987, 565). 
For Rorty, the strength of his liberal utopia lies in the fact that we are no longer 
burdened with the need either to conceive of coherent and rational metaphysical 
grounds for liberalism, or to construct theoretical critiques (of liberalism). This desire 
is immature, and once it is removed we can (to misappropriate Kant) overcome our 
self-imposed immaturity. With the need for metaphysical justifications rejected, we 
can simply “get on” with the practical political matters that we face within the 
modern liberal democratic polity. Metaphysics is a fetish to which we need to break 
our addiction. 
This rejection of metaphysical discourse, with its reliance on a discovered truth of 
the world “as it really is”, may suggest that Rorty is sympathetic to the claims of the 
post-structuralists. But this is not the case, for Rorty believes that the post-
structuralists are guilty of the same immature fetishization of metaphysics and grand 
narratives as Enlightenment and modernist philosophers. In Rorty’s analysis, the post-
structuralists have simply replaced one discourse with another; one form of ideology 
critique with another. Concepts such as metaphysics, grand narratives, and the 
correspondence theory of truth, have been jettisoned in favour of new concepts such 
as “language” or “discourses”, around which the post-structuralists can weave their 
“fantasies” (Rorty 1998, 242). Rorty is just as dismissive of those who espouse the 
“idiot jargon” (Rorty 1987, 570) of the new left as he is of those who demand a 
central place for metaphysics in the contemporary political discourse: 
 
Belief in the utility of this genre [post-structuralism] has persuaded a whole 
generation of idealists in the First World that they are contributing to the cause of 
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human freedom by, for example, exposing the imperialistic presuppositions of 
Marvel Comics, or campaigning against the prevalence of “binary oppositions.” 
This belief has helped produce the idiot jargon that Frederick Crews has recently 
satirized as “Leftspeak” – a dreadful, pompous, useless mishmash of Marx, 
Adorno, Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan (Rorty 1987, 569-570). 
 
Similarly, in a reaction to what he views as the detrimental growth of “identity 
politics”, Rorty laments that: 
 
Nowadays…we are getting a lot of political and social philosophy which takes its 
starting point not from a historical narrative but rather from philosophy of 
language, or from psychoanalysis, or from discussion of the traditional 
philosophical topoi as ‘identity’ and ‘difference’, ‘self’ and ‘subject’, ‘truth’ and 
‘reason’. This seems to me the result of a loss of hope – or, more specifically, of an 
inability to construct a plausible narrative of progress (Rorty 1999a, 232). 
 
Whilst this “new left” may have redescribed the nature of philosophy and 
philosophical analysis, all they have succeeded in doing is replacing one fantasy with 
another. 
In order to transcend this self-imposed immaturity, Rorty argues that metaphysical, 
philosophical, and political theorizing must be replaced by political practice with 
regards to the public sphere. However, in order to achieve this demand, Cruickshank 
suggests, Rorty requires that we “have to accept the [existing] liberal political order as 
a functioning and legitimate ‘given’” (Cruickshank 2000, 18-19). Thus, I suggest, 
following Cruickshank, that Rorty’s liberal utopia is a form of liberal political 
practice that favours the status quo, and has very little room for political analysis and 
change. Therefore, theoretical concepts that problematize and examine the political 
status quo and its power relations − such as using feminism to criticize ascribed 
gender relations, or the politics of exclusion to examine how certain political 
minorities are excluded from the political process − are simply not allowed. Problem 
solving within the Rortyian liberal utopia must confine itself to dealing with tangible 
facts that are neither theoretical nor normative. Politics has been reduced to mere 
administration. As Cruickshank argues:  
 
Instead of theories being used to question the status quo, or to conceptualise 
problems recognised by all (such as economic recessions) from different 
perspectives, we have a positivism which holds that politics deals with ‘facts’, 
which are practical, non-normative and a-perspectival. The ‘facts speak for 
themselves’ and require no theoretical elucidation (Cruickshank 2000, 19). 
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Cruickshank provides the reader with an example of how Rorty’s “facts only” 
approach to political problem solving can run aground when challenged by theoretical 
and/or normative issues. The positivistic-conservative approach that Rorty favours 
would limit us to “tinkering” with the problem at hand, and restricting ourselves only 
to the facts. When discussing the failures of centralized governmental planning, and 
the need to find “an economic setup that satisfactorily balances decency and 
efficiency” (Rorty 1987, 565), Rorty notes that “there is nothing sacred about either 
the free market or about central planning; the proper balance between the two is a 
matter of experimental tinkering” (Rorty 1987, 565).2  
But the reality is that economic policy and problem solving are complex issues, 
and are influenced as much by normative theory as they are by mere “facts”. Indeed, 
the very concept of what a successful economy may resemble is a highly normative 
and contested issue. Even if I limit this discussion to competing economic views 
within liberalism (and thus exclude myriad anarchist, socialist, and Marxist views), 
we can see substantial differences. For those who are influenced by Locke, Hayek, or 
Nozick, a successful economy would recognize the right to private property 
acquisition and disposal, minimal taxation, and a laissez-faire marketplace. 
Conversely, there are those, such as Rawls, who believe that a redistribution of 
resources is just if it helps to improve the wealth and life of those who, through no 
fault of their own, are less well off. Similarly, competing solutions proposed for the 
ongoing Global Financial Crisis suggest that, given the “facts”, we need either 
increased governmental regulation or increased deregulation and market 
liberalization. 
This is only a brief sketch of the complex issues involved in economic policy. But 
what Cruickshank does demonstrate successfully is that very often what are 
considered to be raw facts are, in fact, influenced by normative values. Whilst Rorty 
may suggest that his approach is superior -because we have moved away from simply 
thinking about problems (and running the risk of producing more questions via 
philosophy) to actually solving them - it actually hinges upon a rather one-
dimensional interpretation of what facts are. As Cruickshank concludes, “Rorty’s 
views of politics may be useful for getting the trains to run on time, but it cannot deal 
with politics as a sphere for legitimate problematization of the given and for 
normative contestation” (Cruickshank 2000, 19). 
The strength of Rorty’s liberal utopia lies in the fact that his politics do not require 
a metaphysical or philosophical justification. However, it is the lack of space for 
philosophical content and questioning, as opposed to philosophical justification, 
                                                
2 In David Cameron’s recent speech on the proposed reforms for the ‘modern public service’, the Prime 
Minister spoke in a way that mimicked Rorty’s ‘facts only’ approach to political problem solving. 
Cameron argued explicitly that the proposed reforms were not linked to political theory or ideology, 
but were a matter of problem solving. In the words of the Prime Minister, “These reforms aren’t theory 
or ideology – they are about people’s lives” (Cameron 2011). 
 11 
which is at the heart of Cruickshank’s critique. This argument can be bolstered by 
incorporating a line of critique against Rorty developed by Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe 
does not dismiss Rorty’s politics outright; indeed, she believes that Rortyian 
pragmatism (along with Derridean deconstructionism) “could contribute to the 
elaboration of a non-foundationalist thinking about democracy” (Mouffe 1996, 2). For 
Mouffe, the strength of Rorty’s work can be located in his critical views relating to 
“the pretentions of Kantian-inspired philosophers…who want to find a viewpoint 
standing above politics from which one could guarantee the superiority of 
democracy” (Mouffe 1996, 4). The crux of Mouffe’s dispute with Rorty is not his 
relevance for politics, but rather the form in which his conception of politics 
manifests itself. In demanding a strong separation between the public and private 
spheres in his liberal utopia, Rorty’s view of politics is driven by pragmatic and short-
term solutions, and ultimately promotes piecemeal type social engineering. Mouffe’s 
fear is that Rorty’s liberal utopia is incapable of doing justice to the “multiplicity of 
struggles which call for a radicalization of the democratic ideal” (Mouffe 1996, 3). 
There is a distinct shift away from an approach that advocates more normative 
analysis in favour of one that finds its solution to political problems in the expansion 
of liberalism. Mouffe characterizes Rorty’s solution in the following way: 
 
What ‘we liberals’ should aim at is to create the largest possible consensus among 
people about the worth of liberal institutions. What is needed is a bigger dose of 
liberalism – which he [Rorty] defines in terms of encouraging tolerance and 
minimizing suffering – and a growing number of liberal societies. Democratic 
politics is only a matter of letting an increasing number of people count as 
members of our moral and conversational ‘we’ (Mouffe 1996, 6). 
 
Using the analysis of both Cruickshank and Mouffe to support my argument, I 
propose that Rorty’s liberal utopia is actually anti-political, in that it negates the 
political in its antagonistic form. In believing that a harmonization and consensus of 
values is possible within the public sphere, Rorty is denying the thesis of value 
pluralism and its political implications. Rorty does not accept, as Isaiah Berlin does 
(Crowder 2002; 2004), that conflicts between fundamental values, such as liberty and 
equality, can never be resolved. Any conception of liberal and democratic politics 
necessarily entails a particular understanding of the conflicted nature of politics, and 
this is something that Rorty’s conception is unable to provide. Whilst Rorty has 
provided us with a form of liberal politics that is not hindered by restrictive 
metaphysical claims, it is nevertheless a form of politics that is unable to cope 
adequately with the demands of pluralism, diversity, and identity (Mouffe 1996, 7; 
2005, 88, 89). 
3.2. Solidarity and the Public/Private Dichotomy 
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The second line of critique that I draw against Rorty calls upon the insightful 
analysis of Haber, and her text Beyond Postmodern Politics. Much of her text is 
directed at determining whether postmodern politics can sustain a “politics of 
difference”. Specifically, “can postmodernism remain true to the ideals of radical 
pluralism it borrows from the poststructuralist critique of language and the self and at 
the same time accommodate such pluralism with a new political program?” (Haber 
1994, 43). Concluding her line of enquiry, Haber determines that, ultimately, Rorty’s 
liberal utopia is unsuitable as a philosophical or political model for allowing radical 
pluralism. In order for any philosophical or political model to be used for such a 
purpose, it must not only be “able to accommodate a sense of self-identity…[but] 
self-identity in turn requires identity with others” (Haber 1994, 43). Solidarity, in 
Haber’s analysis, requires that we are able to see parts of our story in those told by 
others, and when enough of us do, we are able to form a vocabulary from which we 
can voice our oppression. This is not to argue that significant points of difference 
ought to be ignored – indeed, identity can be a powerful source of strength – but 
rather it is only from this position of solidarity that points of resistance can be 
constructed and maintained (Haber 1994, 43). Thus, solidarity may be considered the 
political expression of empathy. Accordingly, pluralism requires a form of solidarity 
that is more than just a political expression of toleration. In this context, Haber is 
arguing against the liberal neutralism of Locke and the later Rawls. 
However, the degree of commonality that is required to support and sustain this 
solidarity cannot be achieved by Rorty’s liberal utopia. The primary source of this 
shortcoming lies in Rorty’s continued insistence on the strict separation of the public 
and private spheres. For Rorty, not only is each sphere important in its own right, but 
so too is the separation of one from the other. The public sphere ought to be dedicated 
to social justice, whilst the private sphere is the space for self-creation and perfection. 
Not only do the demands for social justice conflict with the drive for self-creation, 
but, more importantly, what the poet or philosopher may have to offer public life can 
be dangerous or detrimental to the public sphere. In order to prevent this potentially 
detrimental overflow, Rorty solidifies the public/private dichotomy. He posits that it 
is necessary that we make “a firm distinction between the private and the public” 
(Rorty 1989, 83). Indeed, so important is this dichotomy that Rorty believes it may be 
the last conceptual revolution that Western political and social thought needs: “J. S. 
Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to optimizing the balance 
between leaving people’s private lives alone and preventing suffering seems to me 
pretty much the last word” (Rorty 1989, 63).  
For Rorty, this separation is a source of strength, as it allows us to take what is best 
from both spheres whilst eliminating the possibility of detrimental overflow of the 
private into the public. The separation between theory and practice, which both 
Cruickshank and Mouffe have already criticized, is necessary for Rorty’s liberal 
utopia. But what Rorty sees as a necessary separation is, for Haber, the source of his 
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failing. For Haber, it is precisely this separation that “does not allow for the fluidity of 
the public space” that is needed for the development and nurturing of solidarity 
(Haber 1994, 50; Tambornino 1997, 76).  
In Haber’s analysis, those who inhabit Rorty’s liberal utopia ought to be 
interpreted as autonomous and self-created individuals, as can be seen in his 
continued praise of Nietzsche (Rorty 1989, 23-43). But it is at this point that it 
becomes obvious that Rorty is still situated within the Anglo-American tradition. For 
Haber, this is a philosophical and political approach that “sees the self as being fully 
human only to the extent that he or she is a participant in the public realm, but the 
presupposition of that participation is the independent and autonomous citizen” 
(Haber 1994, 61). This conception of the autonomous agent is inexorably linked to the 
Enlightenment tradition, and has been criticized by the Romantics, communitarians, 
and feminists (Jones 2012). It appears as though Rorty has fallen into the same trap as 
many Enlightenment thinkers, in that he assumes that the private autonomous 
individual already exists, and that their existence is completely separate from their 
public one. That is to say, for Haber, Rorty either neglects or intentionally ignores the 
social and political origins and influences of the self (Haber 1994, 61). 
Haber’s fear is that by arguing that the self is antecedent to society, Rorty ignores 
the influences that the political and social dimension can have on the formation of the 
self. By ignoring or denying that the individual is, at least in part, culturally and 
socially constructed, Rorty is blind to the fact that the social and the cultural are 
themselves constructed with a discourse of power relations (Haber 1994, 61). This 
point is illustrated by Nancy Fraser: 
 
Workers’ movements, for example, especially as clarified by Marxist theory, have 
taught us that the economic is the political. Likewise, women’s movements, as 
illustrated by feminist theory, have taught us that the domestic and the personal are 
political….Finally, a whole range of New Left social movements, as illuminated 
by Gramscian, Foucauldian…even by Althusserian theory, have taught us that the 
cultural, the medical, the educational – everything that Hannah Arendt called “the 
social,” as distinct from the private and the public – that all this too is political 
(Fraser 1989, 102, quoted in Haber 1994, 61-62). 
 
Despite what Haber may fear, Rorty is not entirely blind to the role of the public 
sphere and the social with regards to the formation of the individual’s sense of 
identity. As Rorty notes, “Foucault helped us see, or at least reminded us, that our 
own descriptions of ourselves, and thus our own self-knowledge, is dependent on the 
linguistic resources available in our environment” (Rorty 1999a, 232). However, this 
acknowledgement that the self is, to some degree, socially and politically constructed, 
does not mean that identity politics and the politics of difference is something that 
Rorty believes to hold, or believes ought to hold, persuasive force with regards to 
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highlighting and reducing forms of cruelty, be they institutional or social. This form 
of analysis “cannot reveal the philosophical weaknesses of the bourgeois liberalism 
common to Mill and Dewy; they can only reveal its blind spots, its failures to 
perceive forms of suffering which it should have perceived” (Rorty 1999a, 236). 
Rorty explicitly rejects, for example, William Connelly’s argument that liberal 
individualism ignores various forms of suffering because it does not acknowledge that 
the individual is socially constructed. Similarly, Rorty does not accept Iris Marion 
Young’s argument that liberalism is essentially a project of the homogenization of 
difference (Rorty 1999a, 237). 
Rather, Rorty sees liberalism, especially the liberalism of Mill and Dewey, as 
supportive of pluralism. Pluralism, in this context, however, equates to increasing the 
options for individual variation, and group variation, insofar as this can help 
individuals to recreate themselves. More specifically, Rorty does not see “the politics 
of difference as differing in any interesting way from the ordinary interest-group 
politics which has been familiar throughout the history of parliamentary democracies” 
(Rorty 1999a, 237). Even though Rorty, through his praise of Foucault, acknowledges 
the potentially negative effect that social and political forces may have on the 
formation of the individual in the private sphere, pluralism, diversity, and identity, are 
all reduced to the normative and atomistic liberal individual. All forms of ‘otherness’ 
are restricted to the private sphere, and even here they are couched in terms of 
individual identity, or that which is conducive to individual identity, as opposed to 
any form of collective identity.  
Rorty appears to be defending a form of liberalism that, even though it has been 
shorn of its traditional metaphysical foundations, still entrenches a strict separation 
between the two spheres of human life. Furthermore, Rorty is still hesitant to admit 
that the social and political origins of the self require any form of critique of power 
relations other than that proposed by thinkers such as Foucault. This is evident, for 
example, in his discussion of feminism and ideological critique (Rorty 2010a, 103-
112).3 Despite what I believe to be the valid and necessary critique on the part of 
Cruickshank and Haber, Rorty is adamant that philosophy (in the form of ideological 
critique) is only of very limited value insofar as it can be used as a tool for 
progressive political changes, such as those demanded by feminism: 
 
Neither philosophy in general, nor deconstructionism in particular, should be 
thought of as a pioneering, path-breaking, tool for feminist politics….When 
philosophy has finished showing that everything is a social construct, it does not 
help us decide which social constructs to retain and which to replace (Rorty 2010a, 
103).  
                                                
3 For more on this issue specifically, see (Fraser 19996, 303-321) and (Janack 2010). However, Rorty 
argues that contrary to the concerns of many feminists, pragmatism is in fact capable of sustaining a 
feminist agenda (Rorty 2010b, 19-45). 
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Rorty holds that pragmatism, rather than critique for example, is the tool that is 
best suited to delivering these positive changes. Rorty’s defence of pragmatism in this 
context hinges upon the terms of the feminist discourse and critique, their relationship 
to reality, and therefore their ultimate usefulness. In Rorty’s analysis, there is a 
disjuncture between the philosophical views about “truth, knowledge, and 
objectivity”, held by most “contemporary feminist intellectuals”, and the objects to 
which they purport to refer (Rorty 2010a, 106). Rorty contends that these feminists 
argue that the “masculinist ideology” distorts reality, and thus also distorts what many 
women, and indeed men, are led to believe. The result of this distortion is that what 
are considered to be the “innate” and “inevitable” differences between the sexes, are 
in fact a perversion of “the truth”.  
However, Rorty argues this view presupposes that there are, in fact, such things as 
truth, knowledge, and objectivity. But, if the pragmatist analysis is correct, then this 
particular line of feminist ideology critique (against the masculinist ideology) 
collapses: if everything is a social and/or linguistic construction, then there is no truth 
or objective reality that the masculinist ideology distorts. The only assistance that 
philosophy can offer feminism is not at the level of uncovering the cause of this 
distortion, but rather to show us that any given masculinist description, practice, or 
object (such as the innate sexual division of labour, or even what constitutes “man” 
and “woman”) is a social construct. Rorty doubts that beyond this level philosophy 
can be of any use (Rorty 2010a, 107-108). 
This is not to suggest that, for Rorty, there can be no remedy to female oppression. 
Rather, the terms in which the solutions are to be couched have changed: instead of 
“natural” remedies, we ought to think in terms of “cultural” or “societal” ones (Rorty 
2010a, 106). In this sense, feminism ought to view itself as a reformist movement 
rather than one seeking ideological revolution. Rorty suggests that “political goals are 
fairly concrete and not difficult to envisage being achieved; these goals are argued for 
by appeals to widespread moral intuitions about fairness” (Rorty 2010a, 105). Here 
Rorty believes that feminism is analogous to the eighteenth century abolition 
movement, rather than to nineteenth century Communism, in the sense that its goals 
are specific political reforms, not ideological revolution (Rorty 2010a, 105). 
However, by confining the goals of feminism to political reform, Rorty not only 
solidifies the public/private separation, but also denies that what happens in the 
political sphere can have negative consequences in the private sphere. Owing to the 
fact that Rorty institutionalizes the public/private dichotomy, he also institutionalizes 
marginalization and oppression. As correctly identified by Cruickshank and Haber, 
the issues that Rorty has confined to the private sphere need to be brought into the 
open so that they can be made the focus of political critique and debate. Those who 
argue that “the personal is the political”, such as feminists, should be troubled by 
Rorty’s liberal utopia. Opening the private sphere to political critique and debate 
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would have the effect of opening the larger public sphere to modifications and 
changes in directions which would allow for the participation of those who had been 
previously marginalized and excluded. But Rorty’s liberal utopia is unable to 
engender this form of solidarity as it is not capable, I conclude, of offering a critique 
of power relations, especially as they affect the public/private dichotomy. 
4. Conclusion 
At the level of theory, Rorty’s post-foundational interpretation of liberalism holds 
potential as a less exclusionary form of social and political association. This is 
because he intentionally distances himself from the discourse of metaphysics (even 
going so far as to reject the tag of relativism). Instead, Rorty is concerned primarily 
with determining what ‘works’ for ‘us’ as citizens of Western liberal democratic 
states. However, the post-foundational reformulation of liberalism that Rorty presents 
is still essentially a closed and reductionist account of social and political association.  
The problem is not that Rorty’s liberalism is devoid of any metaphysical content. 
Indeed, I think this is potentially a rich vein for political philosophers to explore. 
Rather, the problem lies in the fact that the form that it does ultimately take is 
essentially an unchanged form of Enlightenment liberalism. It closes off all spaces 
that would allow not only for the discussion, but also for the contestation, of 
important normative issues. Rorty’s critique of liberalism simply does not go far 
enough: whilst he examines and rejects the need for metaphysical justifications of 
liberalism, he leaves its political form essentially untouched. Rorty refuses to 
acknowledge that many of the issues he restricts to the private sphere do in fact 
possess a distinct political element, with power-laden overtones. By privatizing 
philosophy, he has ensured that the political discourse of pluralism has been rendered 
ineffective. The dominant political paradigm, indeed the only political paradigm 
within Rorty’s liberal utopia, is that of the “bourgeois liberal”, which amounts merely 
to Enlightenment liberalism by a different name. As Haber argues, “anyone who 
speaks with a voice of the ‘other’ is only allowed [to do so] in the private sphere” 
(Haber 1994, 62). 
The crux of my critique against Rorty, which I have made through the voices of 
Cruickshank and Haber, is that Rorty’s liberal utopia, which is his final word 
regarding the reconciliation of pluralism and politics, is simply not equipped to serve 
those who have been marginalized or excluded by the traditional Enlightenment 
liberal process and its underlying universal and metaphysical assumptions. In order 
for a form of politics that is capable of accommodating the demands of pluralism, 
diversity, and identity, to be viable, it must be able to bring into the political and 
social arena those who have been traditionally marginalized or excluded, as well as to 
allow for the critique of previously normative considerations. In order to be able to do 
this, Rorty would need to politicize what he has confined to the poet and the 
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philosopher. Issues such as class, sex, sexuality, religion, and ethnicity, need to be 
included in the public sphere in addition to the private sphere, and it is clear that 
Rorty does not allow for this. Rorty needs to acknowledge something that has been at 
the forefront of feminist thought since at least the second-wave feminists: that the 
personal is the political. 
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